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Introduction
The concept of computation on encrypted data without decryption was firstly introduced by Rivest, Adleman and Detourzos in 1978 [23] . They defined a privacy homomorphism to be an encryption Enc : P → C which permits the computation Enc(m 1 * m 2 ) from Enc(m 1 ), Enc(m 2 ) without revealing m 1 and m 2 for a certain binary operation * on P. They presented the five privacy homomorphisms [23] , but no ring homomorphic scheme is secure under the known plaintext attacks [4] . One example of a privacy homomorphism given in [23] is as follows. Let p, q be large primes and n = pq. The plaintext space is Z n and the ciphertext space is Z p × Z q . An encryption of a message m ∈ Z n is (m mod p, m mod q) and a decryption is done using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). This cryptosystem is a privacy homomorphism under modular addition and modular multiplication. Unfortunately, it is shown that this privacy homomorphism is broken under the known plaintext attack [4] . In fact, p| gcd(m − c 1 , n) and q| gcd(m − c 2 , n) when Enc(m) = (c 1 , c 2 ). Later, Domingo-Ferrer proposed its variants using additional secret key r p ∈ Z * p , r q ∈ Z * q , but it is also broken under the known plaintext attacks [28, 8] . To avoid the known plaintext attacks, we may consider hiding a message by substituting a part of a message with a random error as in the recent fully homomorphic encryptions.
Basic Idea
We denote by a mod p the unique integer in (− KeyGen(λ): Choose large pairwise coprime integers p i (i = 0, . . . , k) and relatively small pairwise coprime integers Q i (i = 1, . . . , k). Let n = k i=0 p i . Output the secret key sk = (p 0 , . . . , p k ) and the public parameter pp = (n, Q 1 , . . . , Q k ). The message space is
Enc(sk, m): Output c = CRT (p 0 ,...,p k ) (e, m 1 +e 1 Q 1 , . . . , m k +e k Q k ) where m i = m mod Q i for all i, e is a random integer in (−p 0 /2, p 0 /2] and e 1 , · · · , e k are ρ-bit random integers.
Dec(sk, c):
Since the CRT is a ring isomorphism from i Z p i to Z n with respect to modular additions and multiplications, Dec function is also ring homomorphic. However, to decrypt a ciphertext correctly after operations of ciphertexts, the size of e i and Q i must be sufficiently smaller than that of p i . This scheme is a symmetric key encryption scheme which permits bounded number of modular additions and multiplications. We can extend this scheme to a somewhat homomorphic public key encryption scheme by publishing many encryptions of zero and k elementary elements
We reduce the security of our Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE) scheme to a decisional version of Approximate GCD problem (DACD). Approximate GCD (ACD) problem is to find p given many multiples of p with some errors (i.e. x i = pq i + e i ). We remark that the security of the DGHV scheme [13] is reduced to the ACD and that of its efficient variant [12] to a decisional version of the ACD problem that is slightly different from ours for modulus switching.
In fact, our scheme can be regarded as a generalization of the DGHV scheme, but with larger plaintext space. Our scheme can be extended to a Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) through bootstrapping and squashing the decryption circuit as in [14, 13] . However, this could be done only when Q 1 = · · · = Q k = 2, and is not resolved for larger Q i cases.
Let λ be the security parameter. The ciphertext size of our SWHE scheme isÕ(λ 5 ) as in the DGHV scheme. While the plaintext size of the DGHV is O(λ), that of ours is O(λ 4 ) for O(λ)-bit Q 1 , . . . , Q k with k = O(λ 3 ). Consequently, our scheme reduces the overheads (ratio of ciphertext computation and plaintext computation) fromÕ(λ 4 ) toÕ(λ). For the fully homomorphic schemes, the overhead is reduced fromÕ(λ 8 ) toÕ(λ 5 ) with message space Z k
Our scheme has an advantage in the applications requiring larger message space than [17] . When dealing with arithmetic on Z Q for log Q = O(λ 4 ), our SWHE scheme can support O(λ) multiplications with many additions. One of the important applications of homomorphic encryption schemes is to securely evaluate a multivariate function over the integers. Our scheme is the best choice when evaluating a function of degree O(λ) with inputs Ω(λ 2 ). Also our scheme can be used in the applications requiring SIMD style operations in k copies of Z Q for log Q = λ, k = O(λ 3 ). Detailed comparison is given in Section 5.
Related works In 2009, Gentry [14, 15] introduced the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on ideal lattices which supports arbitrary many additions and multiplications on encrypted bit. His breakthrough paper drew an explosive interest and leads numerous researches in this area [13, 11, 12, 16, 26, 27, 24, 17, 3, 2] . Gentry's scheme and its variants [14, 15, 26, 27 ] are based on hard problems on ideal lattices. Another class of schemes [13, 11, 12] relies on the approximate GCD problem. The message space of the schemes is Z 2 and so the overhead is rather high due to the large ciphertext expansion ratio. Our scheme improves their efficiency. Recent schemes based on the learning with error (LWE) or the ring-LWE are more efficient and accomplish polylogarithmic overhead for wide enough arithmetic circuits on Z p for p = poly(λ). For more related works, refer to [18] .
Organization In Section 2, we define some notations and basic problems. Our main scheme and the security proof are represented in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. Applications and comparison with other schemes are given in Section 5. We explain how to extend our scheme to a fully homomorphic encryption in Section 6. Finally, further works are given in Section 7.
Preliminaries
Notation. We use a ← A to denote choosing an element a from a set A randomly. When D is a distribution, we use a ← D to denote choosing an element a according to the distribution D. We use
2 ] which is equivalent to m i modulo p i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} where
. For η-bit primes p 1 , . . . , p k and Q -bit integers Q 1 , . . . , Q k , we define the following distributions:
for ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : output
for some α and β. If e 0 is chosen from Z ∩ [0, q 0 ) uniformly, (e 0 α + e 1 β) mod q 0 is uniform in Z ∩ [0, q 0 ) when gcd(α, q 0 ) = 1.
There are two versions of approximate GCD problem defined by Howgrave-Graham [19] . One is a general approximate GCD problem and the other is a partially approximate GCD problem.
General Approximate GCD problem. The (ρ, η, γ)-computational general approximate GCD problem is: for an η-bit prime p, given polynomially many samples from D γ,ρ (p), find p.
Partially Approximate GCD problem. The (ρ, η, γ)-computational partially approximate GCD problem is: for an η-bit prime p, given a γ-bit integer x 0 = pq 0 and polynomially many samples from D γ,ρ (p), find p.
In this paper, we use only partially approximate GCD problem, we omit the term 'partially' throughout the paper, and denote it by ACD. The ACD assumption is that ACD problem is hard for any polynomial time attacker.
Our Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
We propose a homomorphic encryption supporting large integer arithmetic or SIMD operations. The message space is
. . , Q k are pairwise coprime integers, the message space can be considered Z Q where Q = k i=1 Q i . On the other hand, our scheme can support SIMD operations when all Q i 's are the same.
Parameters
We give some descriptions about the parameters.
λ : the security parameter ρ : the bit length of the error η : the bit length of the secret primes γ : the bit length of a ciphertext τ : the number of encryptions of zero in public key k : the number of distinct secret primes Q : the bit length of Q i for i = 1, . . . k Roughly speaking, k determines the size of the message space. The parameter Q can be an integer from 2 to η/8 depending on the multiplicative depth of the scheme. The details of analysis are given in Section 3.3. The concrete parameters of our scheme are as follows:
-γ = η 2 ω(log λ), to resist Cohn and Heninger's attack [9] and the attack using Lagarias algorithm [20] on the approximate GCD problem (in Appendix C.3).
-η =Ω(λ 2 + ρ · λ), to resist the factoring attack using the elliptic curve method [21] (in Section C.1) and to permit enough multiplicative depth (in Section 3.3).
-ρ =Õ(λ), to be secure against Chen-Nguyen's attack [6] and Howgrave-Graham's attack [19] (in Appendix C.2).
-τ = γ + ω(log λ), in order to use left-over hash lemma in the security proof which is given in Section 4.1.
We choose γ =Õ(λ 5 ), η =Õ(λ 2 ), ρ = 2λ, τ = γ+λ which is similar to the DGHV's convenient parameter setting [13] .
The Construction
and set
Output the public key pk as follows:
Eval(pk, C, c = (c 1 , . . . , c t )): Take as input public key pk, permitted circuit C with t inputs defined in Section 3.3 and a t-tuple of ciphertexts c. Output C(c 1 , . . . , c t ) using Add and Mul given below.
is a set of encryptions of the zero vector, and y is a encryption of the -th elementary vector E in pk.
Remark 3. There are (τ + k) integers of γ-bit and k integers of Q -bit in the public key. The public key size isÕ((τ + k)γ + k Q ) =Õ(λ 10 ) under the parameter setting in Section 3.1.
Remark 4. If k = 1, Q 1 = 2, then our scheme is the same as a noise-free variant of the DGHV [13] .
A ciphertext c ← Enc(pk, m) can be written in the form,
for some e 0 ∈ Z ∩ [0, q 0 ), e 1 , . . . , e k ∈ Z ∩ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), where ρ = max{ρ + log k + Q , 2ρ + log τ }.
Correctness
We use the integer circuits with Add and Mul gates applied to integers rather than a bit. That is, boolean gates are replaced with integer operations. Now we show that the scheme is correct for permitted circuit. At first, we define a permitted circuit similar to Gentry [15] .
Definition 1 (Permitted Circuit). Let C be an integer circuit with t inputs. C is a permitted circuit if an output of C has absolute value at most 2 α(η−4) whenever the absolute value of each t input is smaller than 2 α(ρ + Q ) for any α ≥ 1.
We denote C E as the set of permitted circuits. Now we will show that our scheme is correct
where C ∈ C E , c j ← Enc(pk, m j ) and m j = (m j1 , . . . , m jk ) for j = 1, . . . , t.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). The scheme given in section 3.2 is correct for C E .
Proof. It is enough to show Lemma 6 and 7 that are in Appendix A for the proof of Theorem 1.
Each noise of c 1 + c 2 is increased at most 1-bit. But the bit length of each noise for c 1 × c 2 becomes about 2ρ + 2 Q which is two times larger than that of the original ciphertext. As you see, the noise expansion through multiplication is more significant than addition, so we focus on the multiplicative depth of permitted circuit. Lemma 1. Let C be an integer circuit and f be the multivariate polynomial computed by C.
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
From the above condition, we have
which is similar to the DGHV [13] . Since we want to support polynomial of degree λ, we choose η ≥ ρ · Θ(λ) if we assume log 2 | − → f | is relatively small to η, ρ .
Security
In this section, we prove the security of our scheme. The security of the DGHV scheme is based on the ACD assumption defined in Section 2. On the contrary, the security of our scheme is based on the modified DACD (Decisional Approximate GCD) assumption which says that, for given a distribution D = D ρ (p; q 0 ) and some integer z, it is hard to determine whether z is chosen from D or not. In principle, DACD might be easier than ACD, but so far the only way to solve DACD is to first solve ACD. Therefore, we select the parameters of our scheme based on the attacks on the ACD problem [19, 9, 6] . The details are given in Appendix C.
Reduction to the Approximate GCD problem
To prove the semantic security of our scheme, we introduce another decisional version of approximate GCD problem.
Definition 2 (Decisional Approximate GCD Problem: DACD). The (ρ, η, γ)-decisional approximate GCD problem is: for an η-bit prime p, given a γ-bit integer x 0 = pq 0 and polynomially many samples from
We assume that DACD problem is hard for any polynomial time distinguisher. In the following, we introduce new problems that have a role bridging the gap between DACD problem and our scheme. Overall, our scheme is semantically secure based on the DACD assumption.
The (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-decisional approximate GCD Q problem is: for an η-bit prime p and a Q -bit integer Q, given a γ-bit integer x 0 = pq 0 with gcd(x 0 , Q) = 1, and polynomially many samples from
, k, and polynomially many samples from
We say that the DACD assumption holds if no polynomial time distinguisher can solve the DACD problem with non-negligible advantage. The k-DACD Q assumption is defined similarly. Now we show that our somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is semantically secure under the DACD assumption. This is done by three steps. In the following, arrows indicate polynomial time reductions.
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3: (ρ, η, γ
The first step is rather easily done by multiplying Q thanks to the knowledge of the exact multiple of p. In the second step, DACD Q problem with x 0 = q 0 p 1 is converted to k-DACD Q problem by choosing additional k − 1 primes p 2 , . . . , p k and computing necessary terms in-
In the proof, we use a hybrid argument and lose a factor of k in the success probability. Finally, the last step is done by interpreting the input of k-DACD Q problem as a public key of the scheme.
Lemma 2. The (ρ, η, γ)-DACD problem is reducible to the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-DACD Q problem.
Proof Lemma 3. Let p 1 , . . . , p k be distinct η-bit primes, x 0 = q 0 p 1 be γ 1 -bit integer, and x 0 = q 0 k i=1 p i be γ-bit integer. Then, the (ρ, η, γ 1 , l Q )-DACD Q problem is reducible to the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q problem with the advantage of the latter k times that of the former on average.
Proof. Suppose a polynomial time distinguisher B solves the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q problem. We construct a polynomial time distinguisher A that solves the (ρ, η, γ 1 , l Q )-DACD Q problem. We are assuming B's advantage depends only on the parameter, not the specific value such as p i . For x 0 = q 0 p 1 and 
). Using input (I 1 , z), A constructs an input (I 2 , z ) which will be given to the distinguisher B as follows:
1. Choose Q -bit integers Q 2 , . . . , Q k , η-bit distinct primes p 2 , . . . , p k such that gcd(Q i , x 0 ) = gcd(p i , x 0 ) = 1 for i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
Let
For each sample x i from D, choose e ij ← Z ∩ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) for j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, and construct a sample from the distribution D := D ρ (p 1 , . . . , p k ; Q 1 , . . . , Q k ; q 0 ) by
, . . . , e k ) where e i ← Z ∩ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) for i ∈ {2, . . . , i 0 } and e i ← Z ∩ [0, p i ) for i ∈ {i 0 + 1, . . . , k}.
In
Step 3 and 4, since
, {y } k =1 ) and z to B, and use B's answer to its answer. Interchanging p 1 and p i 0 , we know that z is sampled from D i 0 or D i 0 −1 . This can be distinguished by B with advantage /k, and thus A's advantage is at least /k. Since we do not know i 0 , we randomly choose i 0 and get the average advantage of /k.
To complete the proof of the semantic security of our scheme, we need two more lemmas. Lemma 4 shows that the distribution of fake public key is indistinguishable from that of the correct public key. Lemma 5 implies that an encryption from A is correct form for the scheme.
Lemma 4. For the parameters
) and sk = (p 1 , . . . , p k ) be chosen as in the KeyGen of our scheme. And let us choose x j uniformly from
for j = 1, . . . , τ . Then, pk and pk are computationally indistinguishable if we define pk as (
, {y l } k l=1 ) and sk = (p 1 , . . . , p k ) be chosen as in the KeyGen of our scheme. Let m = (m 1 , . . . , m k ) where m i ∈ Z Q i . For every z ∈ D ρ (p 1 , . . . , p k ; Q 1 , . . . , Q k ; q 0 ), the following distribution
is computationally close to the distribution Enc(pk, m), under the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q assumption. Now we prove the semantic security of our scheme.
Theorem 2. The cryptosystem given in section 3 is semantically secure, if the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose a polynomial time algorithm B breaks the semantic security of the scheme with non-negligible advantage. We construct a polynomial time algorithm A that solves the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q problem with non-negligible advantage. For η-bit distinct primes p 1 , . . . , p k and Q -bit integers Q 1 , . . . , Q k , the input of A is (
The algorithm A works as follows:
, Y := {y 1 , . . . , y k }) to B as the public key. We see that the public key given to B is correctly formed and distributed. It is easy to see that c is uniform in Z x 0 when z is randomly chosen in Z x 0 . Hence in this case, the advantage of A is zero since c does not reveal any information of m b and B's probability of correct guessing is exactly 1/2. On the other hand, if z is randomly chosen in D ρ ((p i ) k ; (Q i ) k ; q 0 ), then c is computationally indistinguishable from the correct encryption of m b by Lemma 5 when we choose τ larger than γ +ω(log λ). Thus, in this case, the probability of correct answer for B is at most negligibly different from that of B. This shows that the advantage of A is non-negligible, violating the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q assumption. Therefore, the cryptosystem given is section 3 is semantically secure.
Applications
In this section, we compare our somewhat homomorphic scheme with other homomorphic schemes when used for integer arithmetic and vector arithmetic (SIMD operations).
Secure Large Integer Arithmetic
Secure integer arithmetic is one of the most important applications of homomorphic encryption schemes. It includes frequently used statistical functions such as mean, standard deviation, logistical regression, and secure evaluation of a multivariate function over the integers. Some applications may require very large integer inputs in the computation of these functions. For the homomorphic computation of these functions, one may use FHEs. However, the large ciphertext expansion and rather high cost of bootstrapping make this cumbersome and inefficient. Also SWHE on small message space can not be efficient since it requires a large depth for integer operations. In fact, even an addition of two λ-bit integers using bit operations needs computing degree-O(λ) polynomial over Z 2 due to carry computation. For Message space (bit length) BV [3] Ours this reason, it is very important to construct an efficient somewhat homomorphic scheme supporting large integer arithmetic on encrypted data. In this subsection, we compare our SWHE with other schemes. There are several homomorphic encryptions based on various hard problems. Gentry's scheme and its optimized variants are still less efficient. FHEs based on the ACD are conceptually simpler, but support only bit operations. More recent schemes based on (R)LWE appear to be most efficient in various parameters. We compare our scheme with the BV scheme in this category [3] . Large integer arithmetic with this scheme can be found in [22] .
In the BV scheme [3] , q > t > ( + 1) λ (2 2λ ) λ and n must be larger than λ to permit depth-λ on -bit integers where the ciphertext space is Z q [x]/(x n + 1) and the message space is Z t [x]/(x n + 1). These constraints can be a disadvantage to encrypt large integers, since the overhead is aboutÕ(n log q/ ) ≈Õ(λ 3 ). To make encryption scheme supporting degree λ on polynomial on large integers in our scheme, it is sufficient to choose O(λ)-bit pairwise coprime integers Q 1 , . . . , Q k . The advantage of our scheme in the overhead stands out, as the plaintext space gets larger.
We give a comparison between [3] and ours with respect to the bit length of the message space in Fig. 1 . If one accepts the lattice rule of thumb conjecture [27], one may need γ = O(λ 5 ) in our scheme. However, considering estimation of lattice reduction time in known attacks, practical parameter for γ in [12] approximately matches toÕ(λ 4 ) and this seems to be sufficient for the security.
Secure Supporting SIMD Operations
For the parallel computations on encrypted data, homomorphic encryptions supporting SIMD operations can be useful. Especially, when it supports integer arithmetic, it can be used to securely evaluate a multivariate function simultaneously on many input vectors. There are several homomorphic encryptions supporting SIMD operations including [25, 17] that use CRT in certain polynomial ring A p := Z p [x]/(F (x)) where F (x) is irreducible over Z but factors into smaller degree polynomials over Z p . In contrast, we use CRT in Z n for a certain composite n.
Smart and Vercauteren's FHE in [25] supports SIMD operations on F 2 d . To evaluate depthlog(λ) arithmetic circuit of average width Ω(λ) over F 2 , the overhead isÕ(N √ N /λ) ≈Õ(λ 5 ) where λ = 2 7 , since one must choose N ≈ 2 27 .
Gentry et al. [17] show that any t-gate, depth-L arithmetic circuit of average width Ω(λ) over F p can be evaluated homomorphically in time t ·Õ(L) · polylog(λ) (Theorem 3 in [17] ) with p = poly(λ). Thus, it cannot support large message space such as Z Q where Q ≈ 2 λ .
In our scheme, the overhead isÕ(λ 2 ) with SIMD operations on k copies of Z 2 for k = O(λ 3 ). If we choose Q 1 = · · · = Q k = Q ≈ 2 λ , the overhead is reduced toÕ(λ) with SIMD operations on k copies of Z Q . Thus, our scheme gets more attractive in dealing with SIMD operations with larger integers.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Our homomorphic encryption can be converted to a fully homomorphic encryption via Gentry's squashing technique as is done in DGHV [13] when all Q i 's are equal to two, based on the sparse subset sum assumption. Note that message space is Z k 2 . Recall that the decryption of message component m i is done by m i ← (c mod p i ) mod Q i = (c mod p i ) mod 2. Our sparse subset consists of y j 's such that
and the secret key s ij 's are included in the public key as an encrypted form Enc(pk, s j ) where s j = (s 1j , s 2j , . . . , s kj ) for j = 1, . . . , Θ. Using the same subset {y j } Θ j=1 for every secret prime p i , parallel computation is possible. By this way, we can lower the multiplicative depth of the decryption to be computed homomorphically.
The remained question is whether this can be done when Q i is larger than two. Since computing Q i -ary addition seems to need more complex carry computations than a binary addition, the proof is not straightforward.
Further Works
In this paper, we proposed a secure ring homomorphic encryption scheme by modifying a privacy homomorphism suggested by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [23] . Our scheme can be extended to a fully homormorphic encryption scheme under the decisional Approximate GCD assumption and the sparse subset sum assumption. One strong point of our scheme is the small overhead when using as a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme of bounded depth over the integers. Especially, when we are to securely evaluate a multivariate function of degree O(λ) with input size Ω(λ 2 ), our scheme has the smallest overhead.
Our scheme is analogous to the DGHV schemes [13] and the public key size is similar to that of the DGHV. It would be interesting how to apply the public key compression technique of [12] to our homomorphic scheme. Also, it is an open problem to design an efficient squashing step for our scheme with Q i > 2, as well as the DGHV. A Correctness
Proof. The proof is straightforward. If c ← Enc(pk, m), then
for some a i and |e i Q i + m i | < 2 ρ + Q for all i = 1, . . . , k. Since C ∈ C E and |c j mod p i | < 2 ρ + Q for all j = 1, . . . , t by Lemma 6,
for all i = 1, . . . , k.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose a polynomial time distinguisher B may distinguish pk from pk with advantage . Using B, we construct a polynomial time distinguisher A that solves the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q problem. Note that the distinguisher A has access to the oracle
. . .
We see that pk (0) has the same distribution as pk, and pk (τ ) has the same distribution as pk . For r = 1, . . . , τ , we define
(Note that in the above formula we omitted other information B has: λ, ρ, η, γ, τ, l Q , k.) Now we are ready to fully define the algorithm A. It has given a number z, which either is from D, or is uniformly random on Z x 0 .
The algorithm A first picks r randomly from {1, . . . , τ }, and selects x * j (j = 1, . . . , τ ) as follows
Then A runs B with input pk * :
, and echoes the output of B as its own answer. Clearly, if z is chosen from D, then pk * has the same distribution as pk (r−1) , and if z is chosen uniformly from Z x 0 , then pk * has the same distribution as pk (r) . Now, if z is from D, we have (Again we omit from the notation other information A has other than z.)
The difference between the two probabilities is equal to
Therefore, in this case A is a distinguisher which solves the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q problem with advantage /τ . Under the (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q assumption, we conclude that the distinguisher B cannot exist.
Proof of Lemma 5. Since we are making (ρ, η, γ, l Q )-k-DACD Q assumption, according to Lemma 4, instead of normally chosen public key pk = (
) with x j chosen uniform randomly from Z x 0 , since both are computationally indistinguishable from each other.
Hence, we need only to compare C pk,z (m) and Enc(pk, m) under the 'false' public key pk . The output of C pk,z (m) is c = k i=1 m i y i + j∈S x j +z mod x 0 , and the output of Enc(pk, m) is c = k i=1 m i y i + j∈S x j mod x 0 . But since x j are uniformly chosen modulo x 0 , we may use the Leftover Hash Lemma, more specifically Lemma 1 from [13] , to conclude that the distribution of j∈S x j is statistically indistinguishable from uniform random distribution on Z x 0 , hence both distributions, c and c, are uniform random on Z x 0 . Switched to the correct public key, this implies that two distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
C Known Attacks on the ACD Problem
In [13] , many attacks on the ACD problem are described. Including those attacks, we analyze additional attacks on ACD problem. We present the attacks depending on the number of approximate multiple of p. Suppose that we are given approximate multiples of p which are x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x m where only x 0 is an exact multiple. If m = 0, we can only use factoring algorithm such as elliptic curve method [21] or number field sieve [5] . If m = 1, HowgraveGraham [19] and Chen-Nguyen [6] can be applied. In the case of m ≥ 2, the Lagarias algorithm for simultaneous Diophantine approximation [20] or Cohn and Heninger's attack [9] can be considered.
C.1 The Factoring Attacks
Given x 0 = pq 0 , a exact multiple of p, one can recover p by using factoring algorithm such as elliptic curve method or number field sieve. Lenstra's elliptic curve method for factoring algorithm [21] runs in time exp(O(η 1/2 )) where log p = η. To avoid this attack, we have to choose η ≥ O(λ 2 ). The time needed by the general number field sieve [5] to factor γ-bit integer x 0 is exp (O(γ 1/3 ) ). Thus we choose γ ≥ O(λ 3 ).
C.2 The Approximate GCD Problem of Two Numbers
Chen-Nguyen [6] Only one sample from D γ,ρ (p) is used for solving ACD problem in ChenNguyen's paper [6] which considers e is in [0, 2 ρ ) rather than (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). Given x 0 = pq 0 and x 1 = pq 1 + e 1 , they start with the following observation:
which holds with overwhelming probability. And then construct polynomial f j (x) defined as
They notice that
where ρ = ρ/2 . Using FFT and multi-point evaluation, it can recover p inÕ(2 ρ/2 ) complexity rather thanÕ(2 ρ ) of the brute force attack. So we choose parameter ρ such that ρ > O(λ).
Howgrave-Graham [19] It suggests two approaches for solving ACD problem, one is the continued fraction method and the other is Coppersmith's method. We describe Coppersmith's method, since it has better results than the continued fraction with respect to a bit-length of noise e. Given x 0 = pq 0 , x 1 = pq 1 + e 1 , it defines q 0 (x) := x 0 , q 1 (x) := x 1 + x and constructs lattice L with the coefficient vector of p i (x) = q 0 (x) u−i q 1 (x) i for some fixed integer u and i = 0, . . . , u. When e is the correct noise of x 1 , p i (−e) = 0 mod p u for i = 0, . . . , u.
If the length of the b 1 which is the first vector of LLL output is smaller than p u , then we find all roots of b 1 over the integers not in Z p u and one of the roots is the correct noise e. The result of this algorithm is that it outputs all integer p ≥ x β 0 such that there exists an e with e ≤ x β 2 0 , and p divides both x 0 and x 1 − e by using LLL algorithm. Thus we choose the parameter γ > η 2 /ρ to resist this attack.
C.3 The Approximate GCD Problem of Many Numbers
Cohn and Heninger [9] They generalize Howgrave-Graham's approach to the case one is given many samples from D γ,ρ (p). Given x 0 = pq 0 and x 1 , . . . , x m ← D γ,ρ (p), their approach is as follows: Heninger's approach has one constraint such that β 2 log x 0 1. We do not know that how much β 2 log x 0 is lager than 1, since the analysis in [9] is given only asymptotically. So we have to analyze more concretely to get practical parameters.
Simultaneous Diophantine Approximation (SDA) [20] This attacker is considered in [13] . Given x 0 = pq 0 and x i = pq i + e i ← D γ,ρ (p) for i = 1, . . . , m, note that the rational numbers y i = x i /x 0 are the instances of the simultaneous diophantine approximation problem. Consider
where s i = e i /p ≈ 2 ρ−η . We now try to use Lagarias's algorithm to solve this problem. m + 1, which is longer than 2 η−ρ . As a rule of thumb, it requires time roughly 2 m/k to output a 2 k approximation of the shortest vector. So it can be found
